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Catastrophic failure SF6 Circuit Breaker

B

BIGEYE

Jan 1, 1970
0
We have had a catastrophic failure of an SF6 circuit breaker. This breaker
was used as a synchronising breaker for a CHP on our 11kV system.
Does anyone have or can point me to articles on failures (causes & effects)
of SF6 circuit breakers.

TIA
 
J

John Rye

Jan 1, 1970
0
Hello

We have had a catastrophic failure of an SF6 circuit breaker. This breaker
was used as a synchronising breaker for a CHP on our 11kV system. Does
anyone have or can point me to articles on failures (causes & effects) of
SF6 circuit breakers.

I have a large collection of papers about SF6 circuit-breakers, but I am not
clear what you need.

If the circuit-breaker has failed it may or may not have released arced SF6
into the substation. If Arced SF6 has been released there are toxic hazards
associated with this, and I hope that you have had the site cleaned up
professionally.

The circuit-breaker may have failed for a number of reasons :-

(a) mechanical failure of a component
(b) Incorrect construction or maintenance
(c) Insulation Failure
(d) Loss of the interrupting medium (SF6 gas in this case)
(e) The breaker was not suitable for the application.

The last cause is probably the most unlikely.

John
 
B

BIGEYE

Jan 1, 1970
0
Thanks for the reply John. We are in the process of decontaminating the sub
station just now. We did not know about the possibility of toxins until made
aware of this by the equipment manufacturer, so we have been in and out of
the sub, many times before starting clean up. However, very little has been
touched.
I don't thing this is an installation problem, as the circuit breaker has
been in operation for a few years. We are focusing on the following as
possible causes:
1.. Synchronising problem
2.. Excessive number of operations, 2439 ops.
3.. Loss of SF6 gas.
The extent of destruction of the CB has taken everyone by surprise,
including manufacturers and insurance investigators, so one of the questions
is why did the switchgear fail so destructively. The CB was used well within
its rating.
If anyone had been in the sub station at time, it may well have been a
fatality. If I get time later today, I will post some photos. onto an image
hosting website.

Thanks
 
| Thanks for the reply John. We are in the process of decontaminating the sub
| station just now. We did not know about the possibility of toxins until made
| aware of this by the equipment manufacturer, so we have been in and out of
| the sub, many times before starting clean up. However, very little has been
| touched.

Arced SF6 can produce disulfur decafluoride (S2F10), which is extremely toxic
on the scale of phosgene. It had even been considered as a possible chemical
warfare agent because, unlike phosgene, it produces no irritation and a lethal
level can be absorbed before the victim becomes aware of it. Freezing point
is -53C and boiling point is 30.1C. So it could be present in liquid form in
the substation, if it was not all gassified by the arc that caused the failure.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disulfur_decafluoride
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulfur_hexafluoride
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phosgene


| I don't thing this is an installation problem, as the circuit breaker has
| been in operation for a few years. We are focusing on the following as
| possible causes:
| 1.. Synchronising problem
| 2.. Excessive number of operations, 2439 ops.
| 3.. Loss of SF6 gas.
| The extent of destruction of the CB has taken everyone by surprise,
| including manufacturers and insurance investigators, so one of the questions
| is why did the switchgear fail so destructively. The CB was used well within
| its rating.

Maybe the excessive operations had accumulated enough S2F10 products that
would produce explosive gasification pressures under another fault.

Another possibility is a structural failure of the gas containment due to
other problems like cracking from extremely cold temperatures or from
temperature differences. Previous operations in cold temperatures could
have created extreme thermal differences, producing cracks in the container
or seals that will eventually either fail unless pressures that should
otherwise not fail, or allowed the gas to escape or be contaminated.

Did only one phase fail? If so, the other phase breakers should be inspected.
I'm sure the manufacturer would be suggesting this.


| If anyone had been in the sub station at time, it may well have been a
| fatality. If I get time later today, I will post some photos. onto an image
| hosting website.

I would be curious to see just how much explosive pressure was involved.
Can you report the normal current and possible fault current at the time
of failure?
 
J

John Rye

Jan 1, 1970
0
Thanks for the reply John. We are in the process of decontaminating the sub
station just now. We did not know about the possibility of toxins until
made aware of this by the equipment manufacturer, so we have been in and
out of the sub, many times before starting clean up. However, very little
has been touched. I don't thing this is an installation problem, as the
circuit breaker has been in operation for a few years. We are focusing on
the following as possible causes:
1.. Synchronising problem
2.. Excessive number of operations, 2439 ops.
3.. Loss of SF6 gas.

A few further questions :-

What technology did the circuit-breaker use ? Puffer ? Rotating Arc ?

What was happening when it Failed ? Was it Opening ? Closing ? or
just sat there doing nothing ?

How big is the CHP set that it is connecting ?

The number of operations may or may not be excessive depending on what duty
the circuit-breaker was designed to meet.
The extent of destruction of the CB has taken everyone by surprise,
including manufacturers and insurance investigators, so one of the
questions is why did the switchgear fail so destructively. The CB was used
well within its rating. If anyone had been in the sub station at time, it
may well have been a fatality.

Anything which leads to an uncontrolled arc within the switching enclosure is
almost inevitably very destructive since it will continue until some back up
protection removes the supply and in certain conditions this can easily be 3
seconds. If you assume that the fault current was 10,000 A, and the arc
voltage is 100 V., and that all 3 phases are involved, the energy dissipated
in 3 seconds is 9 MJ.

John
 
B

BIGEYE

Jan 1, 1970
0
John Rye said:
Hello



I have a large collection of papers about SF6 circuit-breakers, but I am
not
clear what you need.

If the circuit-breaker has failed it may or may not have released arced
SF6
into the substation. If Arced SF6 has been released there are toxic
hazards
associated with this, and I hope that you have had the site cleaned up
professionally.
 
B

BIGEYE

Jan 1, 1970
0
| Thanks for the reply John. We are in the process of decontaminating the
sub
| station just now. We did not know about the possibility of toxins until
made
| aware of this by the equipment manufacturer, so we have been in and out
of
| the sub, many times before starting clean up. However, very little has
been
| touched.

Arced SF6 can produce disulfur decafluoride (S2F10), which is extremely
toxic
on the scale of phosgene. It had even been considered as a possible
chemical
warfare agent because, unlike phosgene, it produces no irritation and a
lethal
level can be absorbed before the victim becomes aware of it. Freezing
point
is -53C and boiling point is 30.1C. So it could be present in liquid form
in
the substation, if it was not all gassified by the arc that caused the
failure.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disulfur_decafluoride
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulfur_hexafluoride
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phosgene


| I don't thing this is an installation problem, as the circuit breaker
has
| been in operation for a few years. We are focusing on the following as
| possible causes:
| 1.. Synchronising problem
| 2.. Excessive number of operations, 2439 ops.
| 3.. Loss of SF6 gas.
| The extent of destruction of the CB has taken everyone by surprise,
| including manufacturers and insurance investigators, so one of the
questions
| is why did the switchgear fail so destructively. The CB was used well
within
| its rating.

Maybe the excessive operations had accumulated enough S2F10 products that
would produce explosive gasification pressures under another fault.

This may well be the cause as the CB had exceeded recommended number of ops
that requires a factory service. The recommended number of ops is 2000, then
the switchgear requires a factory service. This is not stated in the O&M
manual, but advised by word of mouth. Why it wasn't sent away is another
problem.

Another possibility is a structural failure of the gas containment due to
other problems like cracking from extremely cold temperatures or from
temperature differences. Previous operations in cold temperatures could
have created extreme thermal differences, producing cracks in the
container
or seals that will eventually either fail unless pressures that should
otherwise not fail, or allowed the gas to escape or be contaminated.

Did only one phase fail? If so, the other phase breakers should be
inspected.
I'm sure the manufacturer would be suggesting this.

Not sure yet on this as switchgear has still to be sent back to
manufacturers.
| If anyone had been in the sub station at time, it may well have been a
| fatality. If I get time later today, I will post some photos. onto an
image
| hosting website.

I would be curious to see just how much explosive pressure was involved.
Can you report the normal current and possible fault current at the time
of failure?

This is a 1.2 MW CHP, generating at 415 Volts. It is then stepped up to 11
kV by a transformer. The failed circuit breaker is used for switching onto
the bars when synchronisation with the mains has been acheived. Due to the
position of the charging springs, it looks like the problem occured when the
breaker energised. So at this point load shedding would not have kicked in
so the current would have been quite low.
However, the CHP service engineer just ahppened to be working on the CHP
when all this happened, and his account was that the CHP started,
synchronised and energised the circuit breaker.
The CHP started generating up to about 50kW, then displayed -200 kW and the
engine started back firing. This indicates to me that we were shoving power
back into the alternator and driving it as a motor.

The fault current at the transformer on the 11kV side works out to about
8750 Amps.
 
B

BIGEYE

Jan 1, 1970
0
John Rye said:
A few further questions :-

What technology did the circuit-breaker use ? Puffer ? Rotating Arc ?

Puffer I believe. It is a YSF6 circuit breaker.
What was happening when it Failed ? Was it Opening ? Closing ? or
just sat there doing nothing ?

I think it had just closed judging by the charging springs and position of
spring mechanism.
How big is the CHP set that it is connecting ?

It is about 1.27 MW at 415 Volts. Stepped up to 11kV by transformer.
The number of operations may or may not be excessive depending on what
duty
the circuit-breaker was designed to meet.

According to the CHP service personnel and switchgear manufacturers, it is
not uncommon to use circuit breakers as synchronising breakers on HV.
The number of operations is excessive without a factory service. It is not
stated in the O&M manuals, but by word of mouth, that the switchgear is
recommended for factory service after 2000 ops.
 
B

BIGEYE

Jan 1, 1970
0
The only possible place to apply an earth is that CB, unlesss of course
there is an earth fault.

Thanks
 
| This is a 1.2 MW CHP, generating at 415 Volts. It is then stepped up to 11
| kV by a transformer. The failed circuit breaker is used for switching onto
| the bars when synchronisation with the mains has been acheived. Due to the
| position of the charging springs, it looks like the problem occured when the
| breaker energised. So at this point load shedding would not have kicked in
| so the current would have been quite low.
| However, the CHP service engineer just ahppened to be working on the CHP
| when all this happened, and his account was that the CHP started,
| synchronised and energised the circuit breaker.
| The CHP started generating up to about 50kW, then displayed -200 kW and the
| engine started back firing. This indicates to me that we were shoving power
| back into the alternator and driving it as a motor.

Are there any power factor reading logs that might show any rapid changes in
reactive power demands?
 
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